Questions & Puzzles
- Was a position of very great advantage squandered by Rupert?
The royalist position at the start of the day near East Farndon was described by Sir Edward Walker, Charles I's Secretary at War, writing two years later, as upon rising ground of very great advantage about a mile from Harborow [Market Harborough], which we left on our back, and there put in order and disposed to give or receive the charge. It was from this position that Rupert ordered the army to Dust Hill. Two factors deserve consideration.
First, the nature of the position. To the south the land falls gently away towards Clipston village, appropriate either for attack or defence; to give or receive the charge. But on the east the parish boundary hedge of Little Oxendon secured the flank, but also limited any manoeuvre on that side. To the west and to the north the land falls away steeply to the Welland river valley; terrain not suited to fighting. The position is thus one in which the royalists could either stand still or go straight forward. Further, in time, it could be outflanked by way of Great Oxendon further east. Walker was guilty of exaggeration in his description of its military potential.
Second, the purpose of being there in the first place. Rupert was ordered to bring the New Model Army to battle and to defeat it. But at 8am on 14 June he could see no enemy. From the East Farndon position he was looking for was hidden by a ridge 86 feet higher on the other side of the valley. From that higher point Fairfax and Cromwell could see Ruperts formations clearly, but their own army to their rear was hidden. It was not until the parliamentarians decided to move to ground better suited to fighting and, as a result, the New Model Army marched over the ridge, that Rupert had an opportunity to assess the situation. In order to bring his enemies to battle he was obliged to move the royalists from East Farndon to Dust Hill.
- Why did the fighting begin on the western flank?
The frontages of the two opposing armies north and south of Broadmoor were not parallel to one another. The distance between the lines in the east was some 800 yards while on the other flank it was about 1,500 yards; yet it was the western side that saw the first engagement, as all contemporary accounts agree.
A number of explanations can be offered for this. The position of honour in the field was the right of the line, and thus, it is said, the side that decided to attack would do so with the right wing advancing first. However, the contemporary accounts also make it clear that the advance of the royalist right was an uncertain, hesitating manoeuvre, not at all the confident, aggressive thrust that a movement from the honoured position would suggest. Alternatively, it is said that the tactic was a repetition of the attack at Edgehill, but that was not a success in the longer term as the royalist horse broke through their parliamentarian force and failed to return to the field of battle. That a similar situation arose at Naseby could be the source of the idea; a subsequent interpretation being imposed on uncertain circumstances.
The earliest accounts of the battle, including Colonel John Okey's, say that his dragoons took position on the flank of the royalist horse, that is, much further north than later scholars assumed. Most 20th century diagrams of the battle show Okeys men midway between the two opposing lines. Late 20th-century archaeological work with metal detectors has shown significant traces of musket-shot within Sulby Hedges at the northern end and an arc of shot from the northern extremity of the hedge running from north to south on Sulby parish boundary reaching out eastwards for up to about fifty yards.
The following story emerges from the evidence. From his position to the right rear of the parliamentarian lines Oliver Cromwell had a clear view of both the parish boundary hedge on the flank of the royalist cavalry and of Okeys men receiving ammunition close to the artillery train on Mill Hill ridge to the left rear. He summed up the opportunity at once, and rode to Okey to order him to lead his men west of the hedge and to harass the enemy horse. The approach of the dragoons was easily observed by the Royalists, and, unknown to Okey, their horse was supplemented with some 200 musketeers. As soon as Okey's men rode onto the ground on a level with the foot they came under fire, thus the scatter of shot inside the northern end of the enclosure. Okey's men dropped back down the slope out of sight of the musketeers, and themselves opened fire on the horse. The royalist horse, unable to stand under this fire, was forced to move. The advance in the west was precipitated by Okey's attack.
- What was Rupert doing away from the command group around the king?
Prince Rupert was the kings army commander, but it is clear that he took part in the first charge of the right wing. Why? The right wing of horse must have been commanded by someone else, probably Prince Maurice, if Rupert held the higher command.
Perhaps Okey's action explains this puzzle. The arrival of parliamentarian dragoons on the royalist right was unexpected by almost everyone; it came from a snap decision of Cromwell. Thus, as Rupert viewed the scene from a position in the centre rear of his army, a sudden burst of small-arms fire erupts on his right. Whats happening? The quickest way to find out is to ride over and see, and there he finds the ranks of the horse being thrown into confusion by incoming carbine fire from Okey's men. Rupert immediately gives the order to advance and, as contemporary accounts say, he rode with them. They paused to resume proper formation at the foot of the slope; a incident observed by the parliamentarians who attributed this to the boggy condition of the ground. Then, back in formation, they charged Ireton's horse.
- Why did Rupert charge on and attack the baggage train?
The short answer is that he did not. Rupert's journal (actually a document written by his secretary) says: and the right wing, which P[rince] Maurice commanded, P[rince] Rupert was there and beat back the right wing of their horse and a great part of their foot. Seen from Rupert's side, it was the part of Ireton's horse on the right that broke. Rupert's journal then states that he returned to the king's side; presumably the place from which he started.
Frances Rushworth was secretary to Sir Thomas Fairfax and wrote his letter reporting the events of the day in the early hours of the following day. How much is eye-witness evidence and how much is what he gathered from other people is not known. He wrote: A party of theirs that broke through the left wing of horse [i.e. Iretons], came quite behind to the rear of our traine, the leader of them being a person somewhat in habit like the Generall called upon the train's men to surrender. Rushworth later says they learned, but not how or from whom, that this man was Rupert. On that flimsy evidence alone stands the accusation that Rupert neglected his duty and rode off to plunder the parliamentarian baggage. Rupert's own account is ignored, the fact that this was much more likely the ammunition train is forgotten and the supporting testimony is not even sought after.
Rupert acted exactly as he should have done. He investigated unexpected fire, took evading action by ordering the attack and, that completed, returned to his post. If, in the meantime, the king had made some poor decisions, Rupert cannot be held responsible. At the worst he might be blamed for not having returned to the king once the horse was re-formed and before the attack on Ireton took place.
- Did Cromwell exercise outstanding control of his horse?
The myth of Prince Rupert’s attack on the parliamentarian baggage train is traditionally contrasted with the control demonstrated by Oliver Cromwell over the right wing of parliamentarian horse. Examination of the facts, however, suggests the circumstances rather than the commander were the crucial factors.
As the pictogram by Streeter shows, and contemporary accounts confirm, the right wing was compressed into narrow frontage between the foot (Fairfax’s regiment) and the poor ground of the rabbit warren and the gorse and bog beyond it. As a result only two regiments, Colonel Edward Whalley’s and the General’s Lifeguard, could form up in proper style with two troops side by side, while Sir Robert Pye’s had to have one troop in the front line and the other in the second line with Colonel Thomas Sheffield’s and half of Colonel John Fiennes’s. Edward Rossiter’s was also half and half, with the foremost in a position on the extreme right in between the first and second lines. Casualty figures suggest that the fiercest fighting took place between the foot and the warren, the part of the front line occupied by Whalley’s and half of Pye’s, while the other front line troops were relatively unscathed. As the method of fighting was for the cavalry to ride close up, thigh-to-thigh, and with the opposing sides both riding forwards, it follows that the Lifeguard and Rossiter’s were prevented by the terrain form advancing, as was prescribed, ‘at a firm trot.’
The consequence was that, when the royalist horse was at last forced back, only the space between Fairfax’s foot and the warren was open to allow the next line to pass easily. In these circumstances there was no danger of the horse galloping off out of control; there was simply not enough room for them to do so.
A futher consequence was that the General’s Lifeguard of Horse remained available for an attack on Prince Rupert’s Bluecoats having picked their way forward over the rabbit warren.
Joshua Sprigge, whose account was published in 1647, wrote, and his spelling is used here, ‘… Col. Whaley’s Division routed those two Divisions of Langdales, driving them back to Prince Ruperts Regiment, being the Reserve of the enemies Foot, whither indeed they fled for shelter, and rallied … In the mean time, the rest of the Divisions of the Right wing, being straightned [confined] by Furzes [gorse] on the right hand, advanced with great difficulty, as also by reason of the unevennesse of the ground, and a Cony-warren [rabbit warren] over which they were to march, which put them somewhat out of their order …’
That the parliamentary horse did not, in its entirety, pursue the retreating royalists was the result of the terrain, not of peculiar powers of their commander.
- Did the royalist army collapse?
Traditional accounts of the battle suggest that, after a tough fight on Broadmoor, the New Model Army put their enemies to flight, capturing or killing most of the foot. This story was comprehensively destroyed by the publication, in 1995, of the findings of gun shot, both musket and pistol, between Naseby village and the Welland valley, about three miles to the north. The painstaking approach of the metal detectorists, recording their finds and making maps of the results, was the first example of battlefield research of this kind in Britain and allowed Glenn Foard’s book Naseby: the Decisive Campaign to offer a radically revised interpretation of events.
First, the evidence demonstrates that fighting took place on the high ground south of Broadmoor, on the ridge south of the Cromwell Monument. This can only be reconciled with contemporary accounts if it is concluded that the first clash of the foot happened here. The post-1995 discoveries on either side of Sulby Hedges are the foundation for the theory of why the fighting began on the western flank. Most important of all, the long trail of shot northwards disproves the allegation that the royalists fled from Broadmoor and that the battle ended at that point. A number of distinct actions can be identified.
The final fight, according to tradition, was the stand of the Bluecoats. The defeated royalist horse took shelter, according to Sprigge, behind Prince Rupert’s Regiment; that is, the Bluecoats. Sprigge wrote, ‘the remaining business was with part to keep the enemies horse coming to the rescue of their foot, which were now all at mercy, except one Tertia, which with the other part of the horse we endeavoured to break but could not … until such time as the Generall called up his own Regiment of foot …’ The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer of 10-17 June reported, 'The Blue regiment of the Kings stood to it very stoutly, and stir’d not, like a wall of brasse, though encompassed by our Forces, so that our men were forced to knock them down with the But end of their Musquets …’ The evidence from yet other contemporary writings tells us that General Fairfax himself led his Lifeguard of Horse in an attack on the rear of the Bluecoats and that the victorious forces met in the middle of the defeated regiment.
On the Naseby/Sibbertoft parish boundary, immediately west of the modern road, researchers found a great band of musket shot. On the top of the hill, where the farm road goes to Prince Rupert’s Farm, more musket shot was discovered. Between these two concentrations of bullets, on the hillside, pistol shot was scattered. All the signs of a force attacked both from front and rear, and overcome by pistol wielding horsemen. In this field, west of the road, on the forward slope of Dust Hill, the Bluecoats made their stand.
If the old accounts were true, musket shot might be found as men had dropped it in flight, heading north, but the pattern is very different. Clumps of shot border the road and continue along the footpath that heads north from the junction of the Naseby/Sibbertoft road and the Kelmarsh/Sibbertoft road. The traces cross the Sibbertoft/Clipston road and then curve eastwards towards Moot Hill. Here, on the western-facing flank of the summit, a concentration of musket suggests a stand was made. Down the eastern slope is the tell-tale scatter of pistol while in the valley, along the parish boundary, was one of the heaviest concentrations of shot found anywhere in the whole area. The most reasonable explanation is that a fighting retreat took place, one body of men giving covering fire as another fell back along the road from Broadmoor, the royalists pulling back the way they had come that morning. On Moot Hill they stood for a time while their comrades took position on the next hill to the east, Wadborough. Once they were in position, the defenders of Moot Hill turned and ran for their lives, given covering fire from Wadborough where the final organised resistance persisted for a time and then was overwhelmed.
- Where did the atrocities take place?
To the south of Wadborough were the thick hedges of another enclosure, Englands, the inland stock-holding field of the deserted village of Nobold, and beyond it the road between Clipston and Sibbertoft, now jammed with fugitive Royalist camp-followers. The royalist ammunition and baggage trains were obliged to use the roads to avoid getting bogged down. They therefore came down to Clipston village before turning west to pass through the narrow road between the Nobold closes, to the south the site of the abandoned village, to the north an enclosed field. The artillery train had probably been in a position south-west of today’s Lowe Farm for some time, for an arc of shot appears to originate from such a place, resulting in the curve of the line of retreat. But many more carriages had yet to arrive and were still trying to drive up the road as the defeated forces were attempting to get back down it. The road overflowed into Nobold’s northern enclosure.
The pursuing horse could not get through the hedges and the Royalist flank on Wadborough was therefore protected, but not just by the hedges; the field was filled with running women and servants, referred to by ‘a Gentleman in Northampton’ as ‘the middle sort of Ammuniton Whoores, whoe were full of money and rich apparel, there being 1500 of that tribe …’ unable to escape by the road and seeking to get away through the gate on the Clipston side. Many failed. John Rushworth wrote the next day, ‘…the Irish women Prince Rupert brought upon the field … our souldiers would grant no quarter too, about 100 slain of them, and most of the rest of the whores that attended that wicked Army are marked in the face or nose, with a slash or cut.’
The field today is notable for the lack of shot finds, but it has yielded a number of artefacts that suggest that ‘the gate-place in the road between Naseby and Farndon’ where the incident is said to have taken place is the gate by which cattle made their exit from this field.
- How much frontage did the armies take up?
From the battle plans and Streeter’s pictogram the Parliamentarian front line regiments can be identified and the figures for their front lines, assuming foot are six deep and horse three deep, come to about 800 foot and 500 horse. Applying the military manual measurements for frontages and spacings we get distances of 800 yards and 833 yards respectively. To this, in ideal conditions, spaces between the regiments, troops or battalia have to be added. The distance from Sulby Hedges to the eastern side of Lodge Hill is about 2,000 yards which leaves little room for inter-formation interval spaces, but the frequently-made suggestion that the front line is massively overmanned is clearly mistaken. However, men accustomed to parade-ground formations would certainly find that they had to make adjustments in such circumstances, and from the records of the time it appears that is exactly what took place. As to the Royalist forces, with fewer men, it is evident that a front of similar width would be satisfactory, and as their line was, in fact, at an angle to the Parliamentarian position, they had even more space to use.
